Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2008

OLP, LLC and Richard Wilson v. Wayne
Burningham and Optical Lens Products
Managment Inc., DBA Intermountain
Antireflective Coatings : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Hatch, James & Dodge; Brent O. Hatch; Parker Douglas; Philip J. Russell; Attorneys for
Respondents.
Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy; Stephen K. Christiansen; Lisa B. Bohman; Attorneys for
Petitioners.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, OLP, LLC v. Burningham, No. 20080517 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2008).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/1002

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

OLP, L.L.C., a limited liability company,
and RICHARD WILSON, an individual,
Plaintiffs/Respondents,
Case No. 20080517-SC

vs.
WAYNE BURNINGHAM, an
individual, and OPTICAL LENS
PRODUCTS MANAGEMENT, INC.,
DBA INTERMOUNTAIN
ANTIREFLECTIVE COATINGS, a
Utah corporation,
Defendants/Petitioners.

PETITIONERS' REPLY BRIEF

On Certiorari Review to the Court of Appeals, Case No. 20060178-CA
District Court Case No. 010906652, Honorable Robert K. Hilder

HATCH, JAMES & DODGE
Brent O. Hatch (5715)
Parker Douglas (8924)
Philip J. Russell (10445)
10 West Broadway, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801)363-6363
Facsimile: (801)363-6666

VAN COTT, BAGLEY,
CORNWALL & MCCARTHY
Stephen K. Christiansen (6512)
Lisa B.Bohman (10733)
36 South State Street Suite 1900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1478
Telephone: (801) 532-3333
Facsimile: (801)534-0058

Attorneys for Respondents

Attorneys for Petitioners

RLED

TAH APPELLATE COURTS

G:C^
193458v2

IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

OLP, L.L.C., a limited liability company,
and RICHARD WILSON, an individual,
Plaintiffs/Respondents,
Case No. 20080517-SC

vs.
WAYNE BURNINGHAM, an
individual, and OPTICAL LENS
PRODUCTS MANAGEMENT, INC.,
DBA INTERMOUNTAIN
ANTIREFLECTIVE COATINGS, a
Utah corporation,
Defendants/Petitioners.

PETITIONERS' REPLY BRIEF

On Certiorari Review to the Court of Appeals, Case No. 20060178-CA
District Court Case No. 010906652, Honorable Robert K. Hilder

HATCH, JAMES & DODGE
Brent O. Hatch (5715)
Parker Douglas (8924)
Philip J. Russell (10445)
10 West Broadway, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 363-6363
Facsimile: (801)363-6666

VAN COTT, BAGLEY,
CORNWALL & MCCARTHY
Stephen K. Christiansen (6512)
Lisa B.Bohman (10733)
36 South State Street, Suite 1900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1478
Telephone: (801)532-3333
Facsimile: (801)534-0058

Attorneys for Respondents

Attorneys for Petitioners

393458v.2

Table of Contents
Reply Argument

1

I.

Reply to Point I: Application of the LLC Act

3

IL

Reply to Point II: The roles of judge and jury

7

III.

Reply to Point III: Claims and Defenses

12

A.

Reply to Point III.A: Repudiation

13

1.

Reply to Point III.A. 1: Wrongful dissolution

13

2.

Reply to Point III.A.2: Definition of repudiation

15

3.

Reply to Point III.A.3: Court of appeals' review

17

B.

Reply to Point III.B: District court's failure to address capital accounts... 18

C.

Reply to Point III.C: Judicial dissolution

19

D.

Reply to Point III.D: Equitable claims and defenses

21

Conclusion

393458v.2

22

Table of Authorities
Cases

Arfordv. Blalock, 405 S.E. 2d 698 (Ga. App. 1991)

5

CCD, L.C. v. Millsap, 2005 UT42, 116P.3d 366

3

Daines v. Vincent, 2008 UT 51, 190 P.3d 1269

4

Deporter-Butterworth Tours, Inc. v. Tyrrell, 503 N.E.2d 378 (111. App. 1987)

6

DuBarry lnt'l, Inc. v. Southwest Forest Indus., Inc., 282 Cal. Rptr. 181 (Cal. App. 1991)
16
Duke v. Graham, 2007 UT 31, 58 P.3d 540

4

Gherman v. Colburn, 140 Cal. Rptr. 330 (Cal. App. 1977)

15, 16, 17

Harper v. Delaware Valley Broadcasters, Inc., 743 F. Supp. 1076 (D. Del. 1990)

5

Horizon/CMS Healthcare Corp. v. Southern Oaks Health Care, Inc., 732 So.2d 1156
(Fla.App. 1999)

5

In re Marcuse & Co., 281 F. 928 (7th Cir. 1922)

6

International Harvester Credit Corp. v. Pioneer Tractor & Implement, Inc., 626 P.2d 418
(Utah 1981)
7
Jordan v. Holt, 608 S.E.2d 129 (S.C. 2005)

7,9, 10, 19

Judd v. Drezga, 2004 UT 91, 103 P.3d 135

19

K.C. Properties of N.W Arkansas, Inc. v. Lowell Investment Partners, LLC, —S.W.3d—,
373 Ark. 14 (2008)
4
National Farmers Union Prop. & Cas. Co. v. Thompson, 286 P.2d 249 (Utah 1955)

11

Prince v. Harting, 2 Cal. Rptr. 545 (Cal. App. 1960)

7

Purcellv. Southern Hills Invs., LLC, 847 N.E.2d 991 (Ind. App. 2006)

4

Radellv. Comoro, 259 Cal. Rptr. 891 (Cal. App. 1989)

16

Spires v. Casterline, 778 N.Y.S.2d 259 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004)

5

State v. Henriod, 2006 UT \\, 131P.3d232

9

Toddv. Sullivan Construction LLC, 191 P.3d 196 (Idaho 2008)

4

Wanlass v. DLand Title, 790 P.2d 568 (Utah App. 1990)
Zions First Nat'I Bank v. Rocky Mtn. Irr., Inc., 795 P.2d 658 (Utah 1990)

393458V.2

ii

15, 20, 21
7, 10, 21

Statutes
Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-807(l)

5, 13

Utah Code Ann. §§ 48-2c-1301 to -1308

6

Utah Code Ann. §§ 48-2c-903 to -906

6

393458V.2

iii

Reply Argument
Each contention Wilson raises is undermined by the fundamental flaw that infects
and taints the entire judgment: At no time did any trier of fact ever consider and apply the
capital contributions provisions of the LLC Act. Burningham asked for this
determination repeatedly. At every juncture, it was deferred or preempted. Ultimately,
the determination was denied him. The court of appeals then affirmed and justified the
judgment on grounds that the relevant determination had in fact been made.
If the sanctity of a jury determination is such that the appellate courts will justify a
verdict at any cost, then this Court should turn Burningham away. There is no dispute
here that a jury returned a verdict. If the goal instead is resolution of a dispute based on
notions of fair play and substantial justice - including application of the correct law at
some point when repeatedly sued for - then this Court should reverse. The capital
contributions provisions of the LLC Act, which define and delimit the parties'
obligations, were not ever used to measure the parties' conduct - not the contract, not the
good faith, not the fiduciary duty claims.
The lower courts did not have to accept Burningham's proposed method for
deciding this dispute. There is discretion given to a district judge, and an appellate court
on review, in matters of procedure. But the courts were not entitled to allow the
procedure to be managed in such a way that a litigant was deprived of his day in court on
the very issue that everyone now agrees is central to the case.
This Court's case law, and this Court's sense of legal propriety and justice, calls
for an outright reversal of the decision reached by the court of appeals and a remand for
393458v.2

further appropriate proceedings designed to conclude in a proper judgment. Regardless
whether a jury verdict is returned, a judgment entered on any verdict must conform to the
law.
No adequate justification appears in the record for affirming a judgment that was
based solely on the original 50/50 agreement with no regard for the effect of the LLC
Act. Little wonder that the case came out the way it did: Burningham never disputed that
the parties had entered into an oral 50/50 agreement, and he pleaded and argued
throughout that he came to treat the parties' membership interests as something other
than 50/50. This is because the parties' LLC membership interests under the Act were
not to be measured by the initial oral deal, as a matter of law.
The court of appeals concluded that the capital accounts provisions of the LLC
Act do in fact apply in resolving Wilson's claims - a decision Wilson has not appealed.
Yet the record is clear that when the question was raised whether the jury would decide
this issue, the parties stipulated and the trial judge ruled that the decision would be made
by the court. The court of appeals erred as a matter of law in reaching a contrary result.
Because Wilson cannot avoid the fact that the substantive law to be applied in this
dispute has not been applied, his brief now justifies the decision below on procedural
grounds. If this Court is going to judge who won the procedural game, Wilson
indisputably did. If, however, substance is to prevail over form - as it should - then
Burningham is entitled to the protections of the law on this well-preserved record.
This is the court of last resort. Burningham petitions this Court in the interest of
justice to set this matter right with an appropriate reversal and remand.

393458v.2
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Reply to Point I: Application of the LLC Act1
In Point I of his brief, Wilson sets up and then knocks down a straw man. Wilson

argues that Burningham is trying to preempt any common law claim among LLC
members. Wilson then shows - quite persuasively - that LLC members may bring
common law actions among themselves notwithstanding the enactment of the LLC Act.
Wilson's success in this pseudo-argument is misdirected.
Bumingham does not argue that "the Act's provisions regarding dissolution and
winding up provide the sole remedy for Wilson's claims." (Resp. Br. at 18.)
Bumingham plainly established in part I of his opening brief that the LLC Act's "contract
by statute" model implicates the LLC Act in deciding "contract and fiduciary duty
claims, as well as all other issues including damages." (Opening Br. at 22, 28.)
Burningham's opening brief further acknowledges that actions may be brought between
LLC members as referenced in the Act itself. (Opening Br. at 22.)
Burningham's point is that the provisions of the Act provide the rule of decision in
those circumstances where the Act is implicated, including in actions brought between
members. The jurisprudence of this Court holds that the Revised Act is in fact implicated
in contract, tort, and accounting disputes involving members of a Utah LLC. See, e.g.,
CCD, L.C. v. Millsap, 2005 UT 42, \ 16, 116 P.3d 366 (holding members' LLC contract
was "superceded" by the provisions of the LLC Act); Duke v. Graham, 2007 UT 31,

1

Wilson has structured his briefing to respond simultaneously to independent arguments
raised in Burningham's opening brief. To avoid the confusion engendered by such an
approach, this brief will reply to Wilson's arguments seriatim.
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t1f 14-22, 58 P.3d 540 (enforcing terms of an LLC operating agreement that complied
with the provisions of the LLC Act); Dairies v. Vincent, 2008 UT 51, ffl 1, 5,40, 190
P.3d 1269 (holding member not liable for LLC debts based on the provisions of the LLC
Act). In each LLC case previously heard in this tribunal, this Court has confirmed that
the relationship of LLC members must be evaluated in light of the relevant statute
governing the company.
The cases that Wilson cites from other jurisdictions reach the same conclusion:
actions implicating the limited liability statute must be decided with reference to the
statute, even if the claims advanced are common law claims in their form. See Todd v.
Sullivan Construction LLC, 191 P.3d 196 (Idaho 2008) (holding LLC member's fiduciary
duty and willful misconduct claims implicated the provisions of the Idaho limited liability
company act); K.C. Properties o/N. W Arkansas, Inc. v. Lowell Investment Partners,
LLC, —S.W.3d—, 373 Ark. 14 (2008) (resolving LLC dispute based on the provisions of
the Arkansas limited liability company statute); Purcell v. Southern Hills Invs., LLC, 847
N.E.2d 991 (Ind. App. 2006) (affirming application of Indiana limited liability act
standards to the LLC dispute).
The court of appeals has now held that the capital accounts provisions of the LLC
Act provide the rule of decision in determining the parties' ownership interests, and
Wilson has not appealed that decision. (Ct. App. Op.ffif18-19.) This issue is therefore
settled at this point of the litigation. The question thus becomes whether the capital
accounts provisions were in fact used as the rule of decision. The record clearly
demonstrates they were not. {See Opening Br. at 25-28, discussing record; infra Point II.)

393458v.2
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In his Point I, and indeed throughout his brief, Wilson makes arguments regarding
a section of the LLC Act addressing willful misconduct, Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-807(i).
(Resp. Br. at 3, 16-18, 20-21, 29, 32, 40.) Wilson did not so much as mention this
statutory provision in his court of appeals briefing. (Ct. App. Aplee. Br. passim.) Nor
does the court of appeals pass on this provision. (Ct. App. Op. passim.) To the extent
Wilson discusses it to support his new acknowledgment that the LLC Act's provisions
apply to this dispute, that conclusion is agreed to by all parties. To the extent it is
discussed for any other reason, it adds nothing to the analysis now under review by this
Court.
Wilson cites case law to argue that he is entitled to his choice of remedies. (Resp.
Br. at 18-19.) Four of the five cases involve a partnership "wrongful dissolution"
analysis that Wilson eschews in this appeal. (Resp. Br. at 31.) The fifth is a common law
fraud case. (Resp. Br. at 18.) Even if these cases were on point, none of them contradicts
the fundamental principle recognized generally among the common law jurisdictions that
the conduct of owners in a company adopting a statutory form of entity is evaluated in
light of the relevant statute.2

2

See, e.g., Spires v. Casterline, 778 N.Y.S.2d 259, 265-66 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004) (holding
LLC statute provides rights, powers, and responsibilities of members absent controlling
operating agreement); Horizon/CMS Healthcare Corp. v. Southern Oaks Health Care,
Inc., 732 So.2d 1156, 1159 (Fla. App. 1999) (applying statutory rules in partnership
dissolution while rejecting purely contractual arguments); Arfordv. Blalock, 405 S.E. 2d
698, 701-02 (Ga. App. 1991) (rejecting partnership breach-of-contract argument that
failed to recognize the rights of partners under the governing act); Harper v. Delaware
Valley Broadcasters, Inc., 743 F. Supp. 1076, 1089 (D. Del. 1990) (holding partners
could not create by contract a nonstatutory limited partnership without complying with
the governing act); Deporter-Butterworth Tours, Inc. v. Tyrrell, 503 N.E.2d 378, 384 (III.
393458v.2
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Nothing about applying the legislative provisions would "condone bad faith
behavior." (Resp. Br. at 23.) Public policy favors following the Act. Contrary to
Wilson's argument, parties could not unduly profit if the courts faithfully applied the
LLC Act. That is what the parties bargained for when they chose the LLC form.
Moreover, the court-supervised legislative processes assure a proper accounting of all
LLC assets, without limitation. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 48-2c-903 to -906, -1301 to
-1308. Whatever ancillary proceedings or claims may be needed to assure this result may
be allowed by a court exercising proper and reasonable discretion. This process does not
hurt a member in Wilson's shoes, it helps him. But the law embodied in the Act cannot
be ignored in the process.
This is the very process Wilson prevented ever happening when he opposed any
determination that would have actually adjudicated the parties' respective membership
interests under the Act. Adjudicating this dispute using the governing legislative
provisions will not sanction anything but judgments conforming to the law, with adequate
discretion in the courts to see that claims of wrongdoing are properly redressed in the
light thereof.
In sum, the parties agree in this appeal that the LLC Act's capital accounts
provisions provide the rule of decision in Wilson's claims. As discussed further in Point

App. 1987) ("The rules governing the status and liability of limited partners in Illinois
[are] governed by the adoption of the Uniform Limited Partnership Act."); In re Marcuse
& Co., 281 F. 928, 942-43 (7th Cir. 1922) ("The Uniform Partnership Act represents the
law of partnership, and so far as applicable must govern the contract of the parties.").
393458v.2
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II, this rule was not employed in the factual determinations underlying the judgment
below.
II.

Reply to Point II: The roles of judge and jury
As noted in Burningham's opening brief, the parties and the district court used the

terms "equity" and "equitable" to include statutory determinations that they agreed would
be heard by the judge, including capital accounts determinations. (Opening Br. at 10;
Resp. Br. at 47); see also Jordan v. Holt, 608 S.E.2d 129, 130-31 (S.C. 2005) (referring
to LLC statutory determinations as equitable); Prince v. Harting, 2 Cal. Rptr. 545, 554
(Cal. App. 1960) (referring to statutory accounting issues in partnership case as
"equitable"). Burningham asked the district court to determine the parties' respective
membership interests/irsf - before deciding anything else. That way, the parties would
know their membership interests and a fact finder could properly measure the members5
conduct. Nevertheless, Burningham's effort to raise and argue the ownership percentage
issue was permanently preempted by the district court. (R. 303-05, 323-32, 367-89, 52632, 669-70, 882-87, 899-901, 1524-27, 1583-86, 1978-82, 2017 at 22-23.) The court of
appeals then affirmed the district court's determinations.
Wilson cites International Harvester Credit Corp. v. Pioneer Tractor &
Implement, Inc., 626 P.2d 418 (Utah 1981), Zions First Nat'I Bank v. Rocky Mtn. Irr.t
Inc., 795 P.2d 658 (Utah 1990), and the out-of-state cases mentioned in Point I to suggest
that his right to a jury trial trumps Burningham's right to a capital contributions
determination. (Resp. Br. at 23-24.) None of these cases involves a judge splitting out
the case so that a jury only decides one side of the central dispute. The judge here

393458v.2
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specifically said the jury would not decide the capital contributions issue. But resolution
of this issue was necessary for a determination of the case one way or the other.
The court of appeals held that a capital accounts determination is in fact required
to resolve Wilson's claims. In light of this unappealed ruling, Wilson now admits the
necessity of such a finding:
[T]he jury necessarily had to determine the parties' relative ownership interests in
OLP....
. . . To place Wilson in as good a position as if the LLC agreement had been
performed, the jury would have to determine the parties' respective ownership
interests in order to apportion to Wilson his share of the LLC's profits and value.
(Resp. Br. at 25, 26.) It is undisputed on this record that the jury was not instructed how
to accomplish this. This was because the parties agreed that this determination was for
the court, not the jury, and therefore removed any such determination from the jury's
purview. (R. 2026 at 1317-30.) The jury only decided whether Burningham acted
consistently with a 50/50 contract. (R. 1104-08.) Now, after the fact, Wilson attempts to
justify the judgment on grounds that the jury made the very determination that was held
in abeyance.
This court need not tie the hands of district judges in handling LLC disputes.
Burningham is not suggesting there is one and only one way to handle a dispute in a case
that everyone agrees is complicated. (See Ct. App. Op. ^ 35, n.l 1.) Nor is Burningham
suggesting that a trial judge does not have discretion in procedure or the flexibility to
respond to the challenges of a particular case. But inexcusable error resulted in this case,
notwithstanding that discretion, because the correct law was not applied during the course

393458v.2
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of the procedures afforded to the litigants. See State v. Henriod, 2006 UT 1 1 , f l 9, 131
P.3d 232 (failure to properly apply the law is an abuse of discretion).
The district court had a variety of opportunities presented in which to properly
apply the law. Had the district court given proper legal effect to its judicial dissolution
ruling - thereby ordering a proper LLC accounting that included a determination of the
parties' capital accounts - the case could then have properly been postured for a
resolution of Wilson's claims based on those findings. Alternatively, the court could
have ruled that the capital accounts issue was for the jury and required a determination of
all the principal issues at one time, including instructions on determining capital accounts
and a generalized or particularized verdict making those determinations. Or, using the
method the district court did in fact set up, the district court could have followed through
by treating the jury's verdict as advisory only, making findings, and applying such
findings in light of the statute. Or, the district court could have heard all the evidence in
one proceeding and issued rulings on its portion of the case contemporaneous with the
jury returning its verdict.
Alternatively, the district court could have approached the case in some other way
that allowed a decision on the merits of the parties' competing claims. See, e.g., Jordan
v. Holt, 608 S.E.2d 129, 130-31 (S.C. 2005) (trying and deciding LLC accounting issues
simultaneously with common law claims). Regardless, Burningham was entitled to more
than a procedural duping - he was entitled to some fact finder at some point deciding the
merits of the capital accounts issue.

393458v.2
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Dicta in Jordan v. Holt, 608 S.E.2d 129 (S.C. 2005), an LLC decision in the South
Carolina Supreme Court, is illustrative of another way to properly handle a mixed claim
like this. An LLC member sought dissolution and an accounting as well as claims for
breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, breach of the duties of good faith and fair
dealing, fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and gross negligence. See id. at 130. The
trial court dissolved the LLC and awarded the members damages. The damages,
however, were "the difference between the amount of their initial contributions to the
LLC and the amount each receives upon dissolution of the LLC." Id. This aspect of the
trial court's ruling was not appealed. This is not an exclusive approach, but it is one way
to satisfy the demands of the LLC Act. (See Opening Br. at 42-48, arguing members'
entitlement to profits must be viewed through prism of LLC statutory provisions).
The district court's approach here cannot be a preferred method for handling such
claims. The district court acknowledged as much while in the fray:
THE COURT: But I see why you - this is not an easy way to try a case. You've
probably figured that out.
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: I agree.
(R. 2028 at 1511.) Nevertheless, it is in fact the method the district judge chose.
Burningham did the only thing he could do under these circumstances: he preserved his
record and litigated the case the way the district judge ordered. (R. at 1583.)
Rocky Mountain Irrigation does not control on this point. Wilson confuses purely
equitable claims with the statutory determinations required to be made here as part of
Wilson's case. Moreover, neither Rocky Mountain Irrigation nor any other cited case

393458v.2
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involved a deliberate bifurcation of a core statutory determination followed by a decision
not to make that determination.
No marshaling of evidence is necessary to show that Burningham should have
been entitled to obtain a ruling on the capital accounts issue. The district court ruled that
any such evidence could be presented in the trial but would not be part of the jury
determination and would not foreclose the presentation of more evidence in a different
proceeding. (R. 2016 at 4-10, 43-44.) This Court's precedent holds that a party is
entitled to notice in advance - not after the fact - if a claim is to be tried in a particular
forum or in a particular way. See National Farmers Union Prop. & Cas. Co. v.
Thompson, 286 P.2d 249, 253 (Utah 1955). The right to present evidence in support of
such claims in the manner anticipated and directed by the court is inherent in this
procedural right. See id.
Wilson now tries procedurally to preclude Burningham from correcting the lower
courts' prejudicial error by suggesting that Burningham is merely challenging jury
instructions. (Resp. Br. at 3, 27, 42, 45.) Wilson further argues that the jury was given
all the evidence on the capital accounts issue. (Resp. Br. at 27.) These arguments might
be availing on a different record. On this record, however, they cannot withstand
scrutiny.
At Wilson's urging, the district judge did not put this issue to the jury and did not
provide the jury with a legal measuring stick to decide whether the conduct was
appropriate. That there was evidence that could address the point is irrelevant. Evidence
of capital contributions was directed to the separate question of loans to the company by

393458v.2
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IARC - an argument made by Wilson. (R. 2026 at 1319-32.) But whether there was
evidence admitted that would prove a point is a question far different from which trier of
fact is designated to resolve a different point. Wilson now justifies the judgment only by
ignoring the district judge's ruling that the ownership interest issue was for the court, a
ruling with which Wilson concurred and which he did not appeal. Nor has IARC
received the benefit of any determination that it loaned money to the LLC. (R. 1641-42.)
In sum, Bumingham and IARC are entitled to a reversal. If Burningham were
merely disputing whether a jury properly chose between competing facts, there would of
course be no appeal. Rather, the court of appeals concluded, contrary to the record, that
the jury considered and passed on a critical element of the parties' respective claims that
was necessary to the underlying judgment. This is legal error and sanctions an abuse of
discretion that calls for correction by this Court.
III.

Reply to Point III: Claims and Defenses
This Court should review the propriety of the court of appeals' decision in light of

the appropriate standards of review. (Resp. Br. at 28; Opening Br. at 1-2, 42-43.)
Burningham agrees that Wilson properly cites review standards in Point III of his brief.
(Resp. Br. at 28). Burningham, moreover, assigns no error to the standards of review
employed by the court of appeals. Rather, Burningham argues that the court of appeals
erred in applying those standards when it failed to correct the district court's error. This
necessarily entails a review of the district court's actions as well as the conclusions of the
intermediate court.
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A.

Reply to Point IILA: Repudiation

As noted in Point I, supra, the standard from Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-807(l) is
not at issue here. (Resp. Br. at 29, 32.) Wilson's remaining arguments are legally
unpersuasive.
1.

Reply to Point III.A.l: Wrongful dissolution

Wilson argues that "[tjhe partnership wrongful dissolution standard has no
application to this case, which is a suit by one LLC member against another for
damages." (Resp. Br. at 31.) He argues further that the partnership wrongful dissolution
cases "cannot apply here because the LLC Act does not recognize or impose such a
limitation." (Resp. Br. at 31.) These are significant concessions.
Wilson obtained a judgment in the district court based on a partnership wrongful
dissolution theory. Wilson justified the judgment to the court of appeals based on a
wrongful dissolution theory. In doing so, Wilson argued vigorously that the LLC Act did
not apply to limit his claims. With all parties now agreeing that the LLC Act, not the
common law, provides the rule of decision, and with the court of appeals distancing itself
from the district court's wrongful dissolution approach, this Court need not concern itself
further with wrongful dissolution, except to the extent necessary to correct error and
clarify law.
Wilson did not plead a wrongful dissolution case, and Burningham did not urge
one as a principal theory. (R. 1-27, 38-66.) Burningham moved for summary judgment
three times under the LLC Act's plain-language statutory provisions. (R. 117, 158, 608.)
Despite a clear record before trial, Wilson opposed the motion and the district court
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declined to grant it, leaving in limbo the application of the LLC Act's provisions moving
into trial. (R. 171, 703, 1022-23, 1918.)
The district court's refusal to apply the LLC Act left the parties with no choice but
to try the case in the manner the lower court held it would be tried. When Wilson argued
he was entitled to damages as if the LLC Act's provisions did not apply, Burningham
argued any such extra-statutory claim would have to meet extra-statutory common law
elements. (R. 696-701, 703-21, 883-86, 888-91, 1203-07.) That did not mean he agreed
with the district court's decision, and he unequivocally preserved his record. (R. 696701, 703-21, 883-86, 888-91, 1205, 1686-1792, 1871-1954, 2024 at 980.) The district
court specifically acknowledged that Burningham "never wavered" on his claim for
court-supervised statutory remedies. (R. 1583.)
The Utah appellate courts do not punish a litigant for litigating within a framework
established by a court based on erroneous legal conclusions where his principal position
has been preserved for appeal. To the contrary, the very purpose of appellate review is to
correct such errors. Had the district court properly granted Burningham's legal motions,
the issue of "wrongful dissolution" would never have presented itself.
Wilson seeks to co-opt Burningham's position by accusing Burningham of
applying extra-statutory standards. (Resp. Br. at 32.) But, it is Wilson who has
maneuvered his common law claims to exclude the critical determinations required by the
Act. That error should be reversed by this Court.

393458v.2
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2.

Reply to Point III.A,2: Definition of repudiation

Despite agreeing that wrongful dissolution is the wrong analysis, Wilson goes on
to examine "repudiation" in the context raised by the wrongful dissolution cases.
Accordingly, Burningham will reply. As noted, however, the issue is mooted by
Wilson's concession that the Act, not the common law, provides the rule of decision.
Burningham has no quarrel with the common law definition of repudiation set
forth in Point III.A.2 of Wilson's brief. (Resp. Br. at 32-33.) The district court, however,
was not attempting merely to give a common law repudiation instruction. The court was
attempting to explain to the jury the elements underlying the notion of wrongful
dissolution. (R. 1145-46.) The case law distinguishes the use of the "repudiation"
concept in this context by referring to the denial of the existence of an obligation, as
opposed to a breach of any such obligation, even the entirety of such obligation. See
Gherman v. Colburn, 140 Cal. Rptr. 330, 342-43 (Cal. App. 1977).
Wrongful dissolution dicta in Utah law traces directly to the Gherman decision.
See Wanlass v. D Land Title, 790 P.2d 568, 572 (Utah App. 1990). Wilson argues that
the California courts do not in fact require a defendant to deny the existence of the
partnership agreement to sue for damages. (Resp. Br. at 34.) Gherman is clear that it
does. See Gherman, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 339-43. Moreover, the cases preceding Gherman
all deal with a tortious renunciation of a partner's obligation to deal under a partnership
agreement (rather than a mere breach of the contract itself) such that the partnership is
essentially dissolved. See id at 338-39 (discussing prior case law); (Resp. Br. at 35
n.10).
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The case law after Gherman confirms the same. The decision in Radell v.
Comora, 259 Cal. Rptr. 891 (Cal. App. 1989), relied on by Wilson (Resp. Br. at 37), was
subsequently withdrawn by the California courts. See DuBarry Int 7, Inc. v. Southwest
Forest Indus., Inc., 282 Cal. Rptr. 181, 194 n.22 (Cal. App. 1991). In place of RadeWs
poor reasoning, the California courts have reaffirmed the requirement of the bad-faith
denial of the existence of the contract. See id. at 194-95 (striking jury damages award in
dispute over principal-agent agreement).
The district court ruled that the elements identified in Gherman, including
repudiation, needed to be proven to establish a wrongful dissolution. (R. 1145.) Wilson
did not appeal that ruling. To the extent review of the instruction is necessary at all in
light of Wilson's appellate concessions, "repudiation" as instructed was unfaithful to the
law it purported to incorporate. The improper instruction reasonably affected the
outcome of a case in which Burningham indisputably acknowledged the existence of the
LLC, as well as Wilson's joint ownership thereof, and the existence of LLC clients,
accounts, assets, and liabilities. (R. 6-7, 42-44, 1377-78, 1383, 2019 at 271, 274, 286,
2020 at 406 & 423, 2021 at 491, 494-95, 499-500, 2024 at 1096-97, 2027 at 1397-1400,
2028 at 1511;Exs.68&69.)
Wilson argues that Burningham repudiated by rejecting a "duty" to perform the
LLC agreement. (Resp. Br. at 36, 39.) This contention is answered fully by the fact that
repudiation could not be decided without consideration of the parties' respective LLC
interests. See supra Points I & II. When a statute defines the terms of the contract, the
statute's provisions control.
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Wilson also suggests half-heartedly that Burningham "did in fact deny that there
was an agreement between the parties and argued to the jury that no LLC agreement
existed." (Resp. Br. at 35.) Wilson's record cite (R. 2028 at 1614, 1630) does not
support this contention, and Wilson understandably does not press the point.
Burningham argued that a term of the agreement Wilson espoused - the inclusion of
IARC's customer, Cole Vision, as an LLC client - was not clearly established between
the parties as Wilson contended. Burningham's counsel distinguished this dispute about
the scope of the agreement from the idea of no agreement at all. (R. 2028 at 1631.) For
the reasons already discussed, the parties' competing arguments regarding the scope of
their oral LLC agreement do not amount to a repudiation of the existence of the LLC as a
matter of law.
Finally, Wilson argues that Gherman wrongful dissolution is an exception to the
rule requiring an accounting before partners may sue each other. (Resp. Br. at 36.)
Wilson cites no authorities, however, for a case like this one, in which the parties' duties
and responsibilities were determined without reference to statutory provisions that govern
those duties and responsibilities in the first place.
3.

Reply to Point IILA.3: Court of appeals' review

The court of appeals' decision reviewed the judgment on a different legal basis
than that employed by the district court. Wilson's contentions in Point IILA.3 are
answered fully in Burningham's Points I and II, supra, and in Burningham's opening
brief.
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B.

Reply to Point III.B: District court's failure to address capital accounts

In Point III.B., Wilson argues that, "[w]ithin the context of the jury's verdict, a
determination of the parties' capital accounts is not only unnecessary but also
impermissible." (Resp. Br. at 42.) This argument is wrong on two levels. First, it is
wrong as a matter of law because a capital accounts determination is necessary, as the
court of appeals properly held. (Ct. App. Op.ffi[18-19.) Second, it conflicts with
Wilson's argument made elsewhere in his brief that the capital accounts determination
was made by the jury and was in fact a necessary determination. (Resp. Br. at 25, 44.)
Wilson's argument here is that Burningham waived any right to enforce the LLC
agreement, and hence the LLC provisions in the Act, by repudiating. Wilson's argument
is circular. A fact finder could only properly find Burningham repudiated if it considered
the LLC provisions in determining the parties' obligations - which no fact finder ever
did. The ultimate question is always begged in Wilson's analysis.
The court of appeals erred in concluding that the jury properly performed the
equivalent of an accounting. (Ct. App. Op.ffl[32-35.) Following a series of lengthy
colloquies on the point, in which Burningham received repeated assurances from the
Court that the jury's determinations would be advisory for later application of the
relevant law, Burningham agreed that the jury could return a verdict on damages. This
was subject to the district court's express indication that the judge would be examining
the verdict in light of the LLC Act's capital account provisions. It was only with the
court's express assurances that Burningham's counsel agreed to allow a jury verdict on
damages using a non-specific verdict form - different from his own - that did not
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incorporate the Act as his had. (R. 1419-21.) Even so, in closing argument,
Burningham's counsel expressly observed that the resolution of capital accounts was "not
an issue that is actually being presented" to the jury. (R. 2028 at 1628.)
The Court does not have to "second guess" the damages verdict to apply it to the
law. (R. 2028 at 1511.) This Court recognizes that jury fact finding is but one step in
assuring a proper legal judgment. See Juddv. Drezga, 2004 UT 91, ^ 33, 103 P.3d 135
(affirming alteration of jury's damages verdict when entering judgment, based on
statutory provisions). Even if one part of a case is an action for monies between LLC
owners, a court must still view the judgment in light of the entity and its obligations. See
Jordan v. Holt, 608 S.E.2d at 129-31. This Court should assure as much here with
appropriate proceedings on remand so that a judgment may enter which properly reflects
the law.
C.

Reply to Point III.C: Judicial dissolution

Wilson labels as "false55 Burningham's briefing of the district court's dissolution
determination. (Resp. Br. at 46.) That response is indefensible hyperbole. Burningham
moved three times before trial and twice during trial for a ruling that OLP be judicially
dissolved under the provisions of the LLC Act. (R. 117, 158, 608, 2024 at 978-81 & 98990, 2026 at 1247-49 & 1282.) The district court finally granted Burningham's motion.
(R. 2026 at 1282.) There was no suggestion by the district judge that he did not judicially
dissolve. That was the relief asked for and granted. The recharacterization of what
happened has come subsequently from Wilson, not Burningham.
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The district court unquestionably went beyond granting the judicial dissolution
motion to hold that a wrongful dissolution was a jury determination. (R. 2026 at 1282.)
As noted, Burningham insisted only on proper application of the law the district court
chose to apply, whether statutory or common law. Under the district court's extrastatutory common law approach, post-dissolution damages were not available without
wrongful dissolution. See Wanlass, 790 P.2d at 972 (dicta).
The district court of course could have dissolved the LLC before the trial on legal
claims. Wilson cites no legal authority for a contrary proposition. (Resp. Br. at 47.) The
court instead forewent that opportunity.
The court of appeals saw no relation between dissolution and damages. To be
sure, the capital accounts determination was required regardless whether there was a
dissolution, and the court of appeals held as much. (Ct. App. Op.ffif18-19.) Dissolution
presented an opportunity to accomplish this, as did innumerable other opportunities of
which the trial court failed to take advantage. But in some fashion, at some point in time,
Burningham was entitled to the determination he pleaded, argued, and preserved so that
the judgment could properly reflect the resolution of the dispute underlying the parties'
actual deal. The district judge threw the baby out with the bath water when he
permanently deferred the capital accounts issue.
The court of appeals decision remains fundamentally flawed by its failure to
correct error and properly require the Act to be implemented in this dispute.
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D.

Reply to Point III.D: Equitable claims and defenses

As with his statutory capital accounts determinations and his post-dissolution
accounting determinations, Burningham was never given his day in court on his purely
"equitable55 claims and defenses - equitable in the traditional sense. Here, Burningham
agrees that Rocky Mountain Irrigation could apply to bar these purely equitable issues.
The rule in Rocky Mountain Irrigation, however, only applies if the evidence underlying
the claims is the same. In this case, Burningham never received the opportunity to
present or argue his evidence despite expressly asking for it in light of the Court's prior
determinations. (R. 1524-27.)
Burningham's equitable estoppel and laches issues were raised and preserved
below. (R. 1526; Ct. App. Opening Br. at 37-39, 48; Ct. App. Reply Br. at 20-22.) Like
the statutory determinations, the jury could not have decided these issues because they
were never given to the jury to decide.
The courts below erred in denying Burningham the right to present equitable
defenses based on Wilson's prior contrary positions in the litigation. (Ct. App. Op.
ffi[ 34-35; R. 1583-87.) Instead, Burningham was improperly and dispositively charged
with "keeping it all for himself through the date of trial in 2004 when he had come into
court in August 2001, asked for an accounting, and offered to account in any amount
properly determined by the court - only to have Wilson oppose him in these efforts.
Wanlass, at least, stands for a contrary proposition than that reached by the court
here. See Wanlass, 790 P.2d at 572. In Wanlass, "once the [statutory] partnership was
found to exist, Mrs. Wanlass was required to look to the Utah Partnership Act for her
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remedies." Wanlass, 790 P.2d at 571. Mrs. Wanlass argued such remedies were
inadequate because they did not occur until several years after dissolution. The court of
appeals disagreed, holding that "[w]hen the partnership issue remains unsettled for
several years, as it did here, the court has no choice but to retroactively apply section 481-39 and other Partnership Act remedies." Id. at 572. The delay in resolving the
dissolution issue - attributable directly to Wilson - does not and should not change the
parties' rights under the law.
In sum, this Court should review Burningham's claims and defenses applying
appropriate law and reverse and remand for further proceedings thereunder.
Conclusion
In conclusion, this Court should reverse the erroneous judgment of the court of
appeals and remand the case for further proceedings. Those proceedings should ensure
that this dispute is resolved in accordance with the law of this state governing disputes
between members of a Utah limited liability company.
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